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Book Reviews
SEX AND ONTOLOGY
DOI: 10.1177/1350506806068670
Carrie Hull
The Ontology of Sex: A Critical Inquiry into the Deconstruction and Reconstruction of
Categories
London and New York: Routledge, 2006, 185 pp., ISBN 0–415–35791–1
This book offers a useful summary, in the first chapter, of epistemic foundational-
ism. Many students of the subject, I am sure, will find this valuable. The book’s
overall stance and orientation is one with which I am sympathetic.
Hull sets out in the book to counter positivism and postmodernism, and to
defend a form of realism. This is very much what I also set out to do in my book
Enlightened Women (Routledge 1996), which I was sorry to see was not referred to
in the text.
Hull provides a robust defence of the naturalness of the two-sex distinction,
with some very useful scientific evidence in support of her position, against those,
like Judith Butler, who seek to question the naturalness of this distinction and who
argue that sex is a performative construct and that there may be more than one
sex. Hull questions some of the statistical evidence that purports to show that the
number of individuals who deviate from the norm of male and female is signifi-
cant. In fact, she argues, the number of such individuals is very small indeed. She
offers some useful material on the categorization of people into two sexes that will
give food for thought to those who question the two-sex dichotomy. She argues
that it is poor scientific practice to suggest, on the basis of statistically insignificant
numbers, that there may be more than one sex.
This is one point made in the book, and the sex distinction is referred to in a
number of places throughout the book. But the book seeks to go much further than
this. Where it sets out to go further, I would have appreciated some distinction
being made between variants of postmodernism and positivism that would have
made it easier to evaluate the positions defended.
For example, Hull claims that positivists and nominalists are setting out to
counter epistemic foundationalism. She mentions, in this regard, two thinkers
from the analytic philosophical perspective – Nelson Goodman and W.V.O. Quine.
She also refers to two major thinkers from different traditions – namely Foucault
and Judith Butler. She claims that there are similarities between the thought of
these various people, similarities that are not usually drawn to the attention of
potential readers. I think that this is a useful thing to have done. However, I was
left wondering why these particular thinkers had been chosen and why many
others who might have been considered had been left out. For example, there are
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those in the analytic tradition who might be thought to be more obvious – or
equally obvious – candidates for inclusion, who are not even mentioned – for
example Kuhn, Sapir-Whorf or Feyerabend. There are also many more thinkers in
the broadly continental tradition who might have been mentioned.
Then there is the further question: what particular form of postmodernism or
nominalism is being questioned? One thesis that is frequently identified with
Quine for example, is conceptual scheme relativism. But Quine’s work is
dismissed in four pages of Hull’s book. Unfortunately, moreover, the language
used about great thinkers is sometimes insulting. For example, Hull writes: ‘Quine
contends that even from within a single language, meaning can never be shared.
Seemingly eager to gain an advantage in the race to meaninglessness, he dramat-
ically concludes that there is no “meaning to be shared in the first place”’ (p. 32).
It is unfortunate that language like this is used about someone whose thought is
highly original and very influential. There is also a huge literature on his work,
very little of which is mentioned by Hull.
For Quine, the thesis of conceptual scheme relativism is thought to be a conse-
quence of the claim that language determines the limits of our world. It is also
important to point out – and Hull does not mention this – that conceptual scheme
relativism has been used to serve a number of different ends, and these ends need
to be carefully distinguished from one another. One is metaphysical anti-realism
– the view that there is no one determinate way the world is or that there is no
privileged language in terms of which we should describe it. But a different end
is epistemological scepticism – the idea that, for all we know, the world might be
radically different in general character from the way we ordinarily take it to be.
The points made by Hull throughout the book about ontological realism would
cut no ice with a believer in epistemological scepticism. When Hull claims, for
example: ‘Realism characteristically posits the existence of a special class of
entities, the sorts of things rejected by nominalism: causal mechanisms, structures,
kinds and other “universals”’ (p. 83), the epistemological sceptic could simply
reply ‘so what?’ To be fair, Hull does claim that realists are not setting out to
counter the foundationalist. She writes: ‘If it countered that this solution misses
the larger philosophical point of an absolute guarantee for our knowledge, realists
are no longer troubled by this point’ (p. 83). She makes the valid point that it is
important to accept that no theory need be rejected simply because there is a small
number of exceptions to the thesis. She also makes the important point, following
Bhaskar, that experimentation would be impossible were it not for the structured
nature of reality. However, it is difficult to see why Hull spends such a long time
characterizing foundationalism if she is not interested in countering it in any way.
She does not, for example, make many epistemic points – most of her characteri-
zation of realism is done in terms of ontology.
The position she outlines – largely a defence of Roy Bhaskar’s transcendental
realism – is indeed a different position from anti-realism. However, I think that a
believer in anti-realism would need stronger arguments than the claims made here
to be convinced. There is, furthermore, a whole literature offering some very
detailed and sophisticated arguments against metaphysical and epistemic anti-
realism that is not referred to in Hull’s book. There is, for example, Donald
Davidson’s very influential article ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’,
which challenges the coherence of conceptual scheme relativism with some very
nuanced arguments: he distinguishes, for example, total failure of translation and
portal failure of translatability between two hypothetically incommensurable
languages and offers some detailed arguments against each.
There is one final point I would like to make. Hull offers a defence, as I have
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said, of Bhaskar’s transcendental realism. Although much of the empirical
material Hull is referring to – from Foucault and Butler – on sexuality, madness
and punishment, for example, is social, Hull does not refer to the realist theoreti-
cal literature on the social realm. Durkheim, for example, was adamant that social
facts are real entities existing in the real social world, external to the individual
and exerting a causal effect on him or her. He argued that when we perform our
duties as a brother, a husband, a citizen, for example, we carry out commitments
we have entered into and which are defined by law and custom. These things are
intrinsically social and are different from individual acts. They are general
throughout society; external to the individual and constraining. He believes,
indeed, that individual actions derive from society.
This could be argued to be a form of realism. Indeed, there are examples from
Bhaskar himself that Hull could have referred to. But most of Hull’s examples, in
her sections of the book on realism, are taken from the natural sciences. This is
especially unfortunate, given that some realists in the social sciences would like
to challenge the assumption that there is a hierarchy of sciences, with physics at
its root. Some would wish, and not in an anti-realist fashion, to assert the position
of the social world as sui generis.
Overall, then there is much in this book that will be of interest to many different
people. However, I doubt that it will convince those who are not already followers
of critical realism.
Alison Assiter
University of the West of England
NURTURING WHITE IDENTITIES
DOI: 10.1177/1350506806068671
Bridget Byrne
White Lives: The Interplay of ‘Race’, Class and Gender in Everyday Life
London: Routledge, 2006, 200 pp., ISBN 0–4153–4711–4 (hbk), 0–4153–4712–2
(pbk)
Bridget Byrne’s qualitative analysis of white London mothers’ discourse repre-
sents a major step towards establishing whiteness as a serious paradigm in British
sociology. Not only is this an empirical monograph problematizing the racializa-
tion of white identities, but one that does so by focusing on the experiences of
mothers, thus beginning to fill another hole in the literature. Byrne’s work
addresses key themes raised in fieldwork in Britain, and highlights methodologi-
cal issues pertinent to all researchers interviewing people about ‘race’.
Byrne opens with an epistemological discussion outlining the background of
studies of whiteness: ‘the assumption often is that we (everyday white people in
Britain who are not particularly racist) cannot be interesting as “race” has nothing
to do with us’ (p. 1). Indeed, her project involves analysing how the ‘we’ she refers
to is constructed, a project requiring ‘hearing and seeing “race” in contexts where
it is not explicitly felt as present’ (p. 2).
This elusive quality of whiteness generates particular methodological problems
illuminated here. In an engrossing section on narrative methods, she demonstrates
how telling life stories can enable some respondents, but prohibit others from
making themselves subjects: building a story around turning points requires
seeing one’s life in a particularly coherent way in which the self is attributed a
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